• I’ve Seen The Future And It Will Be.

    You can’t predict the future. But you have to.

Business would be easy (and boring) if it wasn’t for The Future. Everybody frets about It, and the more senior your role, the further ahead you fret. What else is running a company, but trying to harness, control or transform Its inescapable countdown to Present? Triggered by a friendly choc des idées at a small conference in Bruges, a reflection two opposing schools of thought.

In 2011, the U.S. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) launched a forecasting tournament to improve methods for predicting geopolitical events. This initiative followed a series of high-profile intelligence failures, including the 9/11 attacks and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had caught analysts off guard.

Among the participants were University of Pennsylvania professors Phil Tetlock and Barb Mellers. Their research project, “Good Judgment,” enlisted 3,800 volunteer forecasters to make predictions on a wide array of global topics—from election outcomes to the thickness of Arctic sea ice to the timing of international trade agreements.

After the first year, the top 2% of forecasters—those with the most accurate predictions—were invited to join small teams of about ten members. These “superforecasters” continued submitting individual forecasts but now had the opportunity to collaborate and debate within their groups. The research team studied whether this teamwork improved accuracy and experimented with statistical aggregation methods to refine collective forecasts.

Good Judgment’s performance was extraordinary. The superforecasters—everyday individuals with no specialized training—consistently outperformed domain experts and even professional intelligence analysts with access to classified information. In some cases, their forecasts were up to 30% more accurate.

Their dominance was so clear that by 2013, IARPA chose to end its partnerships with other teams and continue exclusively with Good Judgment and its 250 superforecasters.

I was one of them.

Minority Report   //   “Precogs?!? The Future is UNKNOWABLE!”

The forecasting tournament concluded in 2013, leading to Phil Tetlock’s book Superforecasting. I participated in a few other similar research projects, and got invited to present on superforecasting techniques at a CFO conference in Bruges, I argued that the systematic approaches used by top performers—probability calibration, evidence evaluation, and belief updating—could be valuable for corporate financial planning. My presentation emphasized that effective forecasting relies on learnable skills rather than innate talent.

During the conference panel discussion, another speaker, a corporate finance professor, advocated a perspective fundamentally different from mine. He argued that the future is inherently unpredictable and that efforts to forecast specific outcomes are a waste of time. Instead, he promoted scenario planning as the only approach worth pursuing by finance professionals, viewing it as a more productive alternative to prediction-based methods.

While I disagreed with his position—particularly its absolutist framing—the debate sparked my curiosity about this fundamental conflict between prediction and planning approaches. Rather than dismissing his arguments, I decided to investigate scenario planning more thoroughly. Following Ken Wilber’s principle that no person is capable of being 100% incorrect, I set out to steelman the case against prediction, seeking to understand what valuable insights might emerge from genuinely engaging with the opposing viewpoint.

I don’t believe that any human mind is capable of 100 percent error… Nobody is smart enough to be wrong all the time.

― Ken Wilber

To address a crucial point immediately: I agree with the professor that the future is not merely uncertain but inherently unknowable. However, some situations are more unknowable than others, and prediction need not achieve perfect accuracy. Being somewhat less wrong can still provide value. Even so, the potential pitfalls of prediction are numerous and serious.

These problems fall into three distinct categories: limitations in the forecasting methods and models themselves, human behavioral biases interfering with the prediction process, and communication breakdowns between forecasters and decision-makers.

Prediction methods often rely on past data and historical patterns, assuming previous relationships will persist—an assumption that frequently fails during periods of rapid change or unprecedented circumstances. Forecasting exercises typically concentrate on specific variables while neglecting broader contexts, blinding forecasters to crucial interconnected factors. When relatively unlikely events have disproportional consequences, prediction failure is huge. The Great Financial Crisis of 2008, chronicled by Nassim Nicolas Taleb in “The Black Swan,” exemplifies this dynamic. Most forecasting efforts focus on short time horizons, failing to account for structural changes or rare but high-impact events. Even well-built models often rest on incorrect assumptions about causal relationships, while reality’s complexity includes non-linear effects and emerging properties that defy prediction.

A second problem other than methods and models are the people running them. Human judgment suffers from predictable cognitive limitations: confirmation bias, overconfidence, groupthink, reliance on mental shortcuts, and emotional interference with rational analysis. Expert overconfidence proves particularly problematic, as domain knowledge can increase certainty without improving accuracy. Many forecasters employ deliberately vague language that makes post-hoc accuracy assessment impossible, allowing poor forecasters to claim vindication regardless of outcomes. When forecasting becomes institutionalized, perverse incentives emerge—forecasters may cherry-pick data or adjust methodologies to produce desired results, while organizations prefer conventional failures over original mistakes.

Finally as predictions get shared with leaders to inform some decision, they typically receive them without understanding underlying reasoning, methodology, or confidence intervals, leading to misplaced confidence in uncertain projections. Few forecasters excel at communicating inherent uncertainty, while decision-makers rarely conduct sensitivity analyses, instead treating point estimates as gospel. Qualities valued in organizational leaders—confidence, decisiveness, clear vision—directly conflict with intellectual habits that produce accurate forecasts: probabilistic thinking, intellectual humility, and comfort with admitting error. Organizational pressures favor simple, definitive answers over nuanced, probabilistic assessments. Once a decision is taken, it can lead an organization to ignore other possible outcomes and let a false sense of security prevent preparation for contingencies. And that is a point where there’s a lot to be said in favor of scenario planning.

Looper  //  Bet he didn’t see THAT one coming…

Scenario planning starts from the premise that there is no such thing as a single defined future, but a multitude of different futures. The method involves creating multiple plausible scenarios, helping organizations prepare for them and make more robust decisions. Companies can use these scenarios to stress-test their strategies, identifying vulnerabilities and opportunities they might otherwise miss.

The method had its signature moment during the 1973 oil crisis. Shell, an oil major, had been developing multiple scenarios since the late 1960s. One of the scenarios foresaw technical limits to oil extraction, creating possible supply shortages and a substantial increase in oil prices that would lead to economic shocks. These scenarios identified that the Gulf States would become the most influential players in terms of oil supply, meaning the oil market could shift from a buyer’s market to a seller’s market. Shell took strategic decisions to increase cracking capacity in their refinery activities to convert heavy fuels, such as fuel oil and bitumen, into lighter fuels such as propane and butane. When the oil crisis materialized, Shell was ready to act. They reduced sales of heavy fuels, and pivoted to lighter fuels for which demand was less elastic since there are no good substitutes. Their competitors struggled, but Shell actually thrived because of the crisis.

When executed properly, scenario planning can significantly expand the range of futures a company considers, challenging linear thinking and revealing strategic blind spots. However, these benefits don’t come without effort or cost. It is easy to underestimate the required effort, and for that reason companies risk making it a one time effort instead of an ongoing discipline. Creating genuinely valuable scenarios demands deliberate effort to move beyond confirmation bias—it’s all too easy for teams to unconsciously design scenarios that simply validate existing beliefs. And developing scenarios can become a purely intellectual exercise by a limited group of people, whose insights do not translate into broad based and concrete strategies and actions. Finally, scenario planning can lead to a false sense of security, while there’s no guarantee that every possible scenario will be covered. The actual future may differ significantly from all scenarios considered, involve interactions between factors that weren’t anticipated, or include truly discontinuous changes that were difficult to imagine.

If a man is considered guilty for what goes on in his mind
Then give me the electric chair for all my future crimes

― Prince, “Batdance”

The main takeaway from scenario planning is a potent one: you can’t predict the future, but you can prepare for it. In that sense, the professor at my conference was right: it is an illusion to believe it is possible to successfully predict.

The problem is: if you are a decision maker, you don’t have a choice. You have to predict.

You can do all the scenario planning you want, at the end of the day you can’t simultaneously invest resources in all possible outcomes. That means decision makers have to assess which outcomes are likelier than others, and what the magnitude of those outcomes will be. Decision making and resource allocation essentially comes down to probability-weighing all possible futures. Making predictions, in other words.

Financial business cases are the staple of any corporate decision making, and they all contain forward-looking opinions on cashflows. You may call them forecasts, estimates, you can bracket them with low and high side scenarios and perform sensitivity analysis, you can hedge by spreading your bets across a couple of different outcomes… but fundamentally, once these assessments drive a decision, they express a certain judgment of what the uncertain future will turn out to be.

Whether you like it or not, you have to make some form of prediction. And going back to Good Judgment, the record shows that it is possible to make better predictions – not by naively picking just one possible future and betting everything on that single scenario, but by doing a better job estimating the relative probabilities. Scenario analysis is definitely useful, but management is about taking action and you can’t always passively keep all options open. In fact, decision makers go beyond making predictions. Once they decide on a certain course, they try with all their might to make it happen and shape the future.

In conclusion, I don’t believe the professor’s point and mine were contradictory. They complement each other. The misconception regarding superforecasters seems to be that they’re in the business of infallible foretell a unique future outcome – but that couldn’t be further away from what they actually do. Supers don’t predict a single scenario, they probability-weigh all possible futures as best they can. They don’t try to be uniquely right, just a little less wrong. Or to paraphrase a Joe Biden line: “Don’t compare my predictions to the Almighty, compare them to the alternatives.”

I’ve Seen The Future And It Will Be.

Credits

Words

> Stefan Verstraeten

Ideas

> If you want to know more about superforecasting and the Good Judgment project, read “Superforecasting: The art and science of prediction“, by Phil Tetlock and Dan Gardner

> To learn about Ken Wilber’s work, there’s his own books but none of them is an obvious easy place to start. Soundstrue.com’s “Kosmic Consciousness“, in which Tami Simon interviews Ken Wilber over the course of many hours, s an excellent overview in audio book format. Wilber is his usual brilliant and funny self, but the man and his work are not without controversy. Mark Manson has an excellent write-up at “The rise and fall of Ken Wilber“,  chronicling his journey studying Wilber’s work which is very similar to my own.

Photo

> Prince, “Batdance”

> Minority Report (2002), directed by Steven Spielberg, based on a story by Philip K Dick

> Looper (2012), written and directed by Rian Johnson

Video

> Prince, “Batdance”